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Winning the Battle of the Narratives in 
Afghanistan
Dean J. Case II and Robert Pawlak
In order to win the information operations war against the Taliban, 
the U.S. policymakers first need to repackage their narrative and 
ensure that it is expressed using frames that Pashtuns are familiar 
with. Rather than pushing a secular frame filled with themes of 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law, the U.S. should use 
frames that reflect both Pashtun beliefs and moderate Islam.
The war against terror cannot be won with force or money alone; in 
order to beat Al Qaeda and the Taliban, you have to have a compel-
ling cause; this is a war that has to be won through moral authority. 
— Hamid Karzai1
The fight in Afghanistan exemplifies the challenges of irregular war-fare, defined by the Department of Defense (DoD) as a “violent strug-gle for influence over the population.” 2 Consequently, this struggle 
for influence can be neither enticed nor coerced. Rather, the battle for the 
proverbial hearts and minds of the Afghan population is one that neither 
force nor materiel resource alone, or in tandem, can win. By many accounts 
the Taliban is currently winning this war, despite a significant deficit in both 
military and materiel resources. One reason behind this asymmetric success 
is the edge the Taliban enjoys with their information operations (IO).3 They 
Major Dean J. Case II is a U.S. Army IO officer currently assigned to USARPAC, 
Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Major Robert Pawlak is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer 
currently assigned to USASOC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. They submitted 
this paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, Califor-
nia), where Major Case received a M.S. in Joint Information Operations and 
Major Pawlak received dual degrees, a M.S. in Defense Analysis (Irregular 
Warfare) and Joint Information Operations. This paper won second place n 
the 2010 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Division Essay Contest. 
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are able to do this by employing narrative frames the Afghan population 
readily understands, providing ample proof to legitimize their narrative, 
as well as enjoying a high degree of consistency between their strategy and 
narrative. Alternately, the U.S. communicates through secular frames that 
lack cultural familiarity, tout a narrative lacking proof in comparison to 
the Taliban’s, and lacks consistency with its strategic goals and narrative.
Table 1. Comparison of Elements of Taliban and U.S. IO 
Taliban
Frame Social Proof Narrative
Islamic Sharia Transparent Justified by Sharia
U.S. Secular Lacks transparency Democracy, human rights,  
rule of law
The U.S., in order to win the IO war against the Taliban, needs to take 
advantage of the narrative gap that exists between the Taliban and Afghani-
stan’s Pashtun population by moving its narrative closer to Pashtunwali 
than the Taliban’s Sharia-laced narrative. However, expressing U.S. goals in 
Afghanistan through the lens of Pashtunwali is easier said than done. As 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai noted, it all starts with the cause.
In spite of the glaring differences between the Taliban’s IO and those of 
the U.S., the U.S. still has both the time and opportunity to turn the tables 
and gain the advantage. As Max Boot, a senior fellow for National Security 
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted:
The war in Afghanistan is far from hopeless. With a slightly greater 
commitment of resources and the introduction of a sensible, unified 
strategic plan (something we’ve lacked so far), we can still turn the tide 
against the Taliban who remain intensely unpopular with most Afghanis 
[sic].4 That is far cheaper and more realistic than throwing up our hands 
in despair and dealing with the fallout of defeat.5
His comments directly address the lack of consistency within and proof 
to support the U.S. narrative. Alternately, the Taliban’s IO relies heavily on 
a stilted, religious content that espouses their brand of Sharia law. While 
this construct adds consistency and clarity to their IO, it also abrades the 
Taliban’s largely Pashtun audience.6 While Pashtuns comprise approximately 
40 percent (about 10 million people) of Afghanistan’s population, they are 
the country’s single largest ethnic group.7 Likewise, the majority of the 
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Taliban’s senior leaders come from Afghanistan’s largest Pashtun tribe, the 
Ghilzais. The significance is that in order to win the war for the influence over 
Afghanistan’s population, one must win the war to influence the Pashtun. 
Pashtuns, who are largely xenophobic, hold their code of Pashtunwali 
closer than Sharia. Consequently, Taliban efforts to enforce elements of 
Sharia that conflict with traditional Pastun beliefs create fissures, which 
could be exploited to drive a wedge between the Taliban and the Pashtun. 
One example of this possibility was the shifting of support from the Taliban 
to the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance in 2001, where a catalyzing factor 
behind this realignment was widespread dissatisfaction with the Taliban 
and its heavy-handed enforcement of their version of Sharia law.
U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan are to deny terrorist safe haven and 
prevent regional meltdown, yet U.S. narratives revolve around themes of 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law.8 This nexus between a stable 
Afghanistan and American democratic values is tenuous at best. Simply put, 
a stable Afghanistan does not necessarily need to be an Afghanistan that 
embraces U.S. style democracy. Alternately, the longest period of stability in 
Afghanistan was brought about by the Taliban from the fall of the Soviet-
backed government in 1991 through 2001. 
Pastunwali
To begin to understand Pashtunwali and what it means to a Pashtun, it 
is necessary to examine some of its basic elements. The key element of 
Pashtunwali is nang: a concept that 
includes honor, dignity, and shame. 
Maintaining the honor of the individ-
ual, the family, and the tribe is perhaps 
the most important daily issue for a 
Pashtun. To be called benanga (shameless, undignified) is possibly the worst 
insult that can be delivered to a Pashtun. In such an instance it is considered 
acceptable that the insulted may kill the insulter to regain his nang and 
social status.9 Maintaining and protecting one’s honor is directly linked to 
one’s identity as a Pashtun. All elements of Pashtunwali reflect back to the 
honor of the individual Pashtun and may concern elements such as badal 
(revenge) and melmastia (hospitality). Revenge is directly tied to honor in 
that it is a method for an individual to restore one’s honor in the face of 
Maintaining the honor of the 
individual, the family, and the 
tribe is perhaps the most impor-
tant daily issue for a Pashtun. 
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insult or wrongdoing. Failing to seek revenge against a transgressor causes 
a further loss of honor on the original victim and his family. Such losses of 
honor are not limited to violent infractions such as the wrongful death of 
a family member, but include more benign acts such as providing hospital-
ity. It is the obligation of a Pashtun to provide hospitality without desire 
for recompense to anyone who should ask for it. Failure to do so dishonors 
the individual and his family. What is important to understand is how 
closely related Pashtunwali and the notion of honor are to the identity of 
the Pashtun. Pashtunwali is so integral to the Pashtun that there exists no 
distinction between practicing Pashtunwali and being a Pashtun.10 The 
individual Pashtun’s identity is bound up in preserving his honor (nang) 
and is found in his close unquestioning observance of the code of conduct 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Elements of Pashtunwali




Pashtunwali stresses egalitarianism. It emphasizes personal autonomy 
and equality of political rights in a world of equals.11 Understanding this 
factor is extremely important in conducting operations in Pashtun areas 
of Afghanistan. This is a world that does not welcome outside influence 
into matters that are considered personal and private. Members of families 
may be on equal footing, and boys are educated to obey elders, but there 
is a subtle line that cannot be lightly crossed. Even elders sitting in legiti-
mately recognized councils, as members of shuras and jirgas, at times may 
not strictly dictate to younger men how to manage their affairs and must 
take care that their decisions are understood by the younger as just and in 
accordance with generally accepted values; the leaders cannot expect the 
younger to obey automatically.12 This allows the individual Pashtun, young 
or old, to retain his honor in accepting the advice of others, as opposed to 
being subjugated to the will of another man or group.
Barfield writes that “being a real Pashtun demands that one not just speak 
Pashto, but do Pashto.” 13 Part of this doing is accomplished by maintaining 
autonomy. Fredrik Barth noted that Pashtun speakers who had forsaken 
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their autonomy for the political protection of Baluch khans were no longer 
viewed as Pashtun by their neighbors, but instead were seen as Pashtun-
speaking Baluchs.14 
By these examples we can observe that within Pashtun culture a code of 
conduct exists; it is tied directly to an individual’s identity and mandates he 
preserve his honor and autonomy. Understanding this factor is key in seek-
ing a means of influencing this population. These examples illustrate that an 
individual Pashtun’s autonomy and honor are matters of both private and 
public maintenance. Private matters are not for public interference, and any 
outside influence must be exercised in a manner that allows the individual 
or family the ability to maintain its dignity and honor. The further away 
from the individual or immediate family the interference comes from, the 
more delicate the influence must be because the potential for slight and 
resentment grows exponentially. Historically, governing bodies outside of 
the district such as the national government are not well received on prin-
ciples of autonomy alone. The rift grows ever wider with the introduction 
of foreigners and yawns hugely in the face of non-Muslims. These factors 
indicate that any serious consideration of employing a strategy of influence 
in Afghanistan demands that the source of influence must be crafted to 
appear to emanate from as local a source as possible to ensure acceptability. 
The Role of Frames and Social Proof
Frames are necessary elements of any social movement. They are employed 
by groups in order to build internal consensus, generate external support, 
and justify actions. When comparing frames, these three separate elements 
need to be examined in terms of the problem they identify, the recommen-
dation they make, and the action they are requiring from both internal and 
external audiences.15 Typically, these three elements are expressed in the form 
of a motivating trinity that labels the protagonist as good, the antagonist as 
bad, and justifies the necessity of the conflict.16 Robert Benford and David 
Snow succinctly describe the reason that groups use frames:
In part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some 
problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make 
attribution regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative 
set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.17
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Other important elements contained within a frame are themes familiar 
to the target audience. By aligning frames with themes familiar to the target 
audience, a group is able to achieve narrative synergy. Thus they are able 
to deliver a message whose meaning transcends its content.18 Similarly, by 
co-opting culturally familiar themes, audiences are generally less likely to 
filter out information contained within a given frame. This functions on 
the cognitive level since the frame expresses a message that conforms to the 
audience’s sense of bounded rationality.19 Simply put, bounded rationality 
Figure 1. The battle for influence over the population in Afghanistan—the role 
of competing narratives, frames, and social proof
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is the minimized model of the world that all people construct in order to 
effectively process all the potentially overwhelming information received 
from various, and sometimes competing, sources. 
Frames are significant in the context of generating support for social 
movements because they represent an expedient means of providing infor-
mation to the population from which a group is attempting to elicit support. 
The audience in turn unpacks the information contained in the frame and 
reassembles it to conform to their sense of bounded rationality.20 Hastie, 
Penrod, and Pennington call the product of this process an individual’s 
story model.21 They then weigh this information against whatever proof 
exists to support a group’s claims. Once the audience has reconstructed the 
information and assembled their story model, the audience then weighs the 
validity of a group’s claims against the presence or absence of proof. Next the 
individual renders what is essentially a verdict. This verdict is not necessarily 
one of guilt or innocence, but rather one of legitimacy. Ultimately, a series 
of frames that effectively motivates intragroup consensus and motivates 
external support is deemed effective. 
Consequently, frames play a large and central role in the development of 
social movements. Effectively constructed and employed, frames are able to 
help create movements able to overcome significant materiel deficits. This 
generally typifies the conditions experienced by insurgents or terrorists and 
further underscores the necessity of winning the IO war.
The U.S. Frame and Social Proof
The United States centers its narrative on democratic principles such as 
equality, human rights, and rule of law and expresses these themes though 
a secular frame. While these themes resonate with a domestic U.S. audi-
ence, they are not clearly understood by the average Pashtun. As altruistic 
as they may seem, the U.S. narrative unfortunately has the ability to both 
alienate the target audience and unwittingly provide another layer of proof 
for the Taliban’s narrative. This does not mean that our goals or intentions 
in Afghanistan are wrong. Rather, it supports the observation that our 
goals in Afghanistan have been crafted and expressed through a uniquely 
American lens. 
The vehicle for achieving these goals contained within the frames of 
the United States is the performance of the democratically elected Afghan 
government and their security forces. Yet many observers note that both 
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are essentially the same warlords who governed Afghanistan prior to the 
2001 U.S.-led invasion and that Hamid Kharzi is little more than the mayor 
of Kabul.22
By attempting to compel Pashtuns to accept American solutions for 
governance and security, the U.S. is executing policy that was wrong footed 
from the start. Notoriously xenophobic, Pashtuns view outsiders and their 
influence as a violation of nang, their code of honor. Western concepts of 
rule of law and equality often undercut the authority of local leaders and 
customs by inviting outsiders into issues that are private matters to be settled 
privately, resulting in a loss of honor to those concerned. The ill will that this 
creates can easily fuel badal if left unchecked as well as provide opportunity 
for the Taliban. Consequently, John Dempsey, head of the U.S. Institute of 
Peace’s Kabul office, noted in a May 2009 interview, “Afghans are largely 
disillusioned with the whole democratic experiment.” 23
While Pashtuns are admittedly egalitarian, the Pashtun audience largely 
fails to make a connection between their sense of freedom and the U.S. theme 
of democracy. The U.S. expresses Western 
ideals using themes that are rich in content 
when viewed through our cultural lens, but 
fail to resonate when viewed through the 
eyes of a Pashtun. An example lies in the 
perceived failure to curb corruption within 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the 
Afghan security forces. Rampant corruption within the government is a 
source of public discontent, and curbing it is a top priority for U.S. policy-
makers.24 Yet this is easier said than done. As noted earlier, many Afghan 
civil and military leaders are little different than the warlords who have 
traditionally governed Afghanistan. Consequently, calls to curb corruption 
are met either with skepticism or ignored. 
When viewed through the U.S. lens, corruption is either a rule of law 
concern or a function of democracy that voters correct by casting their 
ballots. Alternately, when viewed through a Pashtun lens, corruption becomes 
a matter that local and tribal leaders remedy through jirgas where community 
leaders create transparency through consensus. 
Likewise, the disparity between the U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan 
and the themes contained in the U.S. narrative adds another layer of friction 
to the problem. Current U.S. strategic goals are focused on denying terrorists 
… the Pashtun audience 
largely fails to make a  
connection between their 
sense of freedom and the 
U.S. theme of democracy.
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safe haven and prevent a regional meltdown.25 While an American may 
intuitively see the nexus between democracy and stability, this is a result of 
the effectiveness of the U.S. narrative on its own audience. Yet in the same 
manner that the U.S. narrative fails to resonate with a Pashtun audience, 
Pashtuns do not see how democracy is synonymous with stability. Alternately, 
the U.S. narrative potentially achieves the opposite of its intended effect by 
providing a constant reminder that the U.S. and its goals operate well outside 
the realm of Pashtunwali. This is the unintended consequence of project-
ing narratives that resonate with U.S. audiences onto a Pashtun audience.
Consequently, the U.S. frame in Afghanistan fails to generate the support 
needed to gain and maintain influence over the population. This is evident 
in the lack of internal consensus within the GIRoA and its security forces, 
as well as the lack of active popular support for the U.S.-backed government.
Ultimately the social proof provided to Pashtuns by the U.S. frame is 
that they—the U.S., coalition forces, the GIRoA, and Afghan security forces—
are yet another outside influence seeking to push a foreign system of govern-
ment on Afghans. From an Afghan or Pashtun perspective, there is little 
perceptible difference between the U.S. frame and that of the Soviets during 
the 1980s. Both are foreign nations who threaten their communities and 
their traditions. 
The Taliban Frame and Social Proof
The Taliban, by using the formal theological language of Sharia, appeals 
to the rich and widely understood Islamic theological tradition.26 Conse-
quently, they are able to co-opt the inferred legitimacy of Islam into their IO. 
Importantly, this also allows them to extend the theological implications of 
the battle between good and evil into their narrative. Alternately, the U.S., 
while using local language, lacks the familiar and legitimate frames used 
by the Taliban. The result is that the Taliban’s message, while not perfect, 
clearly dominates the message of the U.S.
The Taliban, by centering their frame on the language of Sharia, as 
Professor Thomas Johnson suggests, creates a box around their target audi-
ence. In order to penetrate this box, the Taliban reasons, one would have 
to adopt language whose perceived strength and legitimacy is greater than 
the theological language of Islam.27 
Contained within these frames are the core elements of the Taliban’s 
narrative: the Afghan government is corrupt, U.S. and NATO are malign 
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foreign actors, and the Taliban can restore security and order to Afghani-
stan. Barnett Rubin listed a series of specific themes contained within the 
Taliban’s narrative and how these are used: 
Recruit support based on government corruption, civilian casualties 
caused by coalition/NATO (especially air power), resentment of the 
expulsion of Pashtuns from Northern Afghanistan, intimidation, supply-
ing of justice, consistent and reliable organization, and ability to pay 
some fighters.28 
Hence, the Taliban is able to connect their narrative with themes that reso-
nate with their Afghan audience. Further packaging their narrative and its 
associated themes within a Sharia frame ensure that the audience will not 
filter out the Taliban’s message. Lastly, by including themes that point directly 
to malign foreign influence, the Taliban also effectively aligns their narrative 
with Pashtun xenophobia. On a cognitive level, this functions to ensure that 
the message conforms to the audience’s sense of bounded rationality. Since 
it conforms to the audience’s preconception for what they expect to hear 
and it conforms to how they view the world, they are less likely to reject it 
without consideration. 
Additionally, the Taliban is able to provide ample proof to substantiate 
their narrative. In large parts of Afghanistan, especially in the troubled 
Southern provinces, the Taliban operates an effective shadow government.29 
This government provides courts, levies taxes, and maintains their own 
governmental and security apparatus. Their courts not only enforce viola-
tions of Sharia but also hear civil complaints. While at times brutal, the 
Taliban’s courts provide both reach and responsiveness that Afghanistan’s 
legitimate legal system lacks. Similarly, the Taliban’s taxes go to pay for the 
fighters who provide security within the Taliban’s area of control. Likewise, 
the Taliban has gone to great lengths to stamp out baksheesh (corruption).30 
The Taliban’s consistent narrative, use of familiar frames, and ample 
social proof provide them a clear edge in the battle to gain influence over 
the Afghan population. An additional element of proof rests in the fact that 
the Taliban are virtually uncontested in large parts of Afghanistan. Taliban 
commanders and mullahs frequently and freely meet with village elders, 
spreading the Taliban’s influence while sending the additional message that 
the Americans and NATO may come and go, but we will always be here.31
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Comparing Competing Narratives and Frames
When comparing the competing narratives, the audience operates much 
in the same way a jury operates during deliberation. First, each opposing 
side’s story is taken and reconstructed by the individual so that it conforms 
to their sense of bounded rationality. Then this repackaged story model is 
compared against the availability of proof to substantiate the claims of the 
story. What follows is that the story model is either legitimized or delegiti-
mized by the presence or absence of associated elements of proof. Finally, 
the individual makes a decision or in the case of a jury member, renders a 
verdict in favor of one side of the story. 
Table 3. Side-by-side comparison and evaluation of current Taliban 
  and U.S. narratives, frames, and proof
Narrative Frame Proof Advantages/Disadvantages






(+) Employs familiar frame
(+) Substantial proof
(-) Conflicts with Pashtunwali
U.S. Democracy Secular Elections, support 
for GIRoA
(-) Lacks consistency
(-) Uses unfamiliar secular  
     frame
(-) Lacks proof
Given the current state of IO in Afghanistan, this process clearly favors 
the Taliban’s narrative. While significant differences exist between members 
of a jury and a population in the midst of irregular warfare, the role played 
by competing narratives, frames, and proof is nearly identical. People, when 
making decisions to support or reject an insurgency, operate in a manner 
similar to an evidence-based jury; no matter how well scripted the argu-
ment, compelling evidence is required in order to gain majority support.
The Rift between the Taliban and the Afghan People
The fault line between the Afghan people, and the Pashtuns in particular, 
and the Taliban lies in the divide between the Taliban’s brand of Sharia 
and Pashtunwali. While closely associated and even familiar to the beliefs 
held by Pashtuns, the Taliban’s version of Sharia undermines several key 
elements of Pashtunwali:
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a. Role of the jirga in deciding local and tribal matters—that is, the 
Taliban’s series of shadow courts have replaced the time-honored 
jirgas at the expense of local leader’s influence. 
b. Local leaders are reluctant to issue orders or edicts to another Pashtun 
for fear of violating their deeply held sense of egalitarianism.
c. Pashtuns bristle at the harsh punishments rendered by the Taliban.32 
Regaining the Initiative
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently noted 
that Afghanistan had been an economy-of-force operation for too long.33 His 
statement coupled with the announcement that the new strategy of the U.S. 
in Afghanistan would focus more on increasing the capacity of the Afghan 
government to meet the basic needs of its people and less on conventional 
military operations. This shift in strategy results partially from the recogni-
tion that elements of U.S. strategy and operations in Afghanistan serve to 
enable and legitimize aspects of the Taliban’s narrative. 
Although the new strategy of the U.S. will help turn the tide against the 
Taliban and represents a clear and unified strategy, which was previously 
missing, it still lacks a consistent narrative that will help drive a wedge 
between the Taliban and the Afghan people. While U.S strategic goals focus 
on the basic needs of the Afghan people as the means to a stable and secure 
Afghanistan, its narrative still contains themes that resonate and motivate 
U.S. domestic audiences, not Afghan audiences. 
An example is the recent firestorm of criticism, from both within the U.S. 
as well as from other NATO countries, over Afghanistan’s passing of a body 
of laws that govern Shia family life.34 One element of this family law was 
termed a rape law because it seemingly guarantees a husband the right to 
have sex with his wife, even when she says no.35 While this theme resonates 
with domestic audiences, to Afghans it provides another example of how 
the U.S. is trying to force its will and beliefs on Pashtuns. 
To win the IO war against the Taliban, U.S. policymakers first need 
to repackage their narrative and ensure it is expressed using frames that 
Pashtuns are familiar with. Rather than pushing a secular frame filled with 
themes of democracy, human rights, and rule of law, the U.S. should use 
frames that reflect both Pashtun beliefs and moderate Islam. A retooled 
U.S. narrative should rely on frames that reinforce local jirgas as the source 
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of grass-roots democracy in Afghanistan, reinforce the role of moderate 
Sharia within Afghan civil society, and continue to promote efforts to curb 
corruption within the Afghan government and security services. This new 
narrative, expressed within the frames of moderate Islam and Pashtunwali, 
would deftly enable the U.S. message to resonate better with the Pashtuns 
than the Taliban message. 
Consequently, the final element necessary to gain narrative legitimacy 
and influence over the Afghan people is observable proof. This proof comes 
in three forms:
a. Increased security for the population, to include those in rural areas
b. Increase in the capacity of the Afghan government to meet the basic 
needs of its people
c. Success in curbing corruption within the Afghan government. 
Ultimately, this will enable the U.S to win the war of the narrative, and the 
IO war in Afghanistan, by providing the Afghan people with a familiar 
narrative, fully supported by observable proof. 
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